Part

SYSC Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls sourcebook

Chapter

Remuneration Code

Printed on: 24/11/2024

Rulebook at: 02/04/2015

SYSC 19A

Remuneration Code

SYSC 19A.1

General application and purpose

  • 01/01/2011

Who? What? Where?

SYSC 19A.1.1

handbook-rule
  1. (1) The Remuneration Code applies to:
    1. (a) a building society;
    2. (b) a bank;
    3. (c) an investment firm;
    4. (d) an overseas firm that;
      1. (i) is not an EEA firm;
      2. (ii) has its head office outside the EEA; and
      3. (iii) would be a firm referred to in (a), (b) or (c) if it had been a UK domestic firm, had carried on all of its business in the UK and had obtained whatever authorisations for doing so as are required under the Act.
  2. (2) In relation to a firm that falls under (1)(d), the Remuneration Code applies only in relation to activities carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom.
  3. (3) Otherwise, the Remuneration Code applies to a firm within (1) in the same way as SYSC 4.1.1 R (General Requirements).
  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.1.1B

handbook-rule
  1. (1) The Remuneration Code applies to :
    1. (a) a building society;
    2. (b) a bank;
    3. (c) an investment firm;
    4. (d) an overseas firm that;
      1. (i) is not an EEA firm;
      2. (ii) has its head office outside the EEA; and
      3. (iii) would be a firm referred to in (a), (b) or (c) if it had been a UK domestic firm, had carried on all of its business in the UK and had obtained whatever authorisations for doing so as are required under the Act.
  2. (2) In relation to a firm that falls under (1)(d), the Remuneration Code applies only in relation to activities carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom.
  3. (3) Otherwise, the Remuneration Code applies to a firm within (1) in the same way as SYSC 4.1.1 R (General Requirements) or, in the case of a CRR firm, General Organisational Requirements 2.1 in the PRA Rulebook.
  • 02/04/2015

SYSC 19A.1.2

handbook-guidance

Part 2 of SYSC 1 Annex 1 provides for the application of SYSC 4.1.1 R (General Requirements). In particular, and subject to the provisions on group risk systems and controls requirements in SYSC 12, this means that:

  1. (1) in relation to what the Remuneration Code applies to, it:
    1. (a) applies in relation to regulated activities, activities that constitute dealing in investments as principal (disregarding the exclusion in article 15 of the Regulated Activities Order (Absence of holding out etc)), ancillary activities and (in relation to MiFID business) ancillary services;
    2. (b) applies with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities in a prudential context; and
    3. (c) takes into account activities of other group members; and
  2. (2) in relation to where the Remuneration Code applies, it applies in relation to:
    1. (a) a firm's UK activities;
    2. (b) a firm's passported activities carried on from a branch in another EEA State; and
    3. (c) a UK domestic firm's activities wherever they are carried on, in a prudential context.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.1.2A

handbook-guidance

Subject to the provisions on group risk systems and controls requirements in SYSC 12:

  1. (1) in relation to what the Remuneration Code applies to, it:
    1. (a) applies in relation to regulated activities, activities that constitute dealing in investments as principal (disregarding the exclusion in article 15 of the Regulated Activities Order (Absence of holding out, etc)), ancillary activities and (in relation to MiFID business) ancillary services;
    2. (b) applies with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities in a prudential context; and
    3. (c) takes into account activities of other group members; and
  2. (2) in relation to where the Remuneration Code applies, it applies in relation to:
    1. (a) a firm's UK activities;
    2. (b) a firm's passported activities carried on from a branch in another EEA State; and
    3. (c) a UK domestic firm's activities wherever they are carried on, in a prudential context.
  • 02/04/2015

When?

SYSC 19A.1.3

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must apply the remuneration requirements in SYSC 19A.3 other than SYSC 19A.3.44R (3), SYSC 19A.3.44A R, SYSC 19A.3.51R (2) and SYSC 19A.3.51R (3), SYSC 19A.3.51B R and SYSC 19A.3.54R (1)(c), in relation to:
    1. (a) remuneration awarded, whether pursuant to a contract or otherwise, on or after 1 January 2011;
    2. (b) remuneration due on the basis of contracts concluded before 1 January 2011 which is awarded or paid on or after 1 January 2011; and
    3. (c) remuneration awarded, but not yet paid, before 1 January 2011, for services provided in 2010.
  2. [Note: article 3(2) of the Third Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2010/76/EU)]
  3. [Note: This provision is shown with PRA changes made by PRA 2014/22. To see the FCA provision, select the date 31/12/14 from the date picker above]
  4. (2) A firm must apply the remuneration requirements in SYSC 19A.3.44R (3) and SYSC 19A.3.44A R in relation to remuneration awarded for services provided or performance from the year 2014 onwards, whether due on the basis of contracts concluded before, on or after 31 December 2013.
  5. [Note: article 162(3) of CRD]
  6. (3) A firm must apply the remuneration requirements in SYSC 19A.3.51R (2) and SYSC 19A.3.51R (3), SYSC 19A.3.51B R and SYSC 19A.3.54R (1)(c) in relation to remuneration awarded on or after 1 January 2015.
  7. [Note: This provision is shown with PRA changes made by PRA 2014/22. To see the FCA provision, select the date 31/12/14 from the date picker above]
  • 01/01/2015

SYSC 19A.1.4

handbook-guidance

Subject to the requirements of SYSC 19A.1.5 R, in the appropriate regulator's view SYSC 19A.1.3 R does not require a firm to breach requirements of applicable contract or employment law.

[Note: recital 14 of the Third Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2010/76/EU)]

  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.1.5

handbook-rule
  1. (1) This rule applies to a firm that is unable to comply with the Remuneration Code because of an obligation it owes to a Remuneration Code staff member under a provision of an agreement made on or before 29 July 2010 (the "provision").
  2. (2) A firm must take reasonable steps to amend or terminate the provision referred to in (1) in a way that enables it to comply with the Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.
  3. (3) Until the provision referred to in (1) ceases to prevent the firm from complying with the Remuneration Code, the firm must adopt specific and effective arrangements, processes and mechanisms to manage the risks raised by the provision.
  • 01/04/2013

Purpose

SYSC 19A.1.6

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.
  2. (2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the CRD which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices on 10 December 2010. Provisions of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3115) together with the European Banking Authority's Guidelines to article 75(1) and (3) of the CRD relating to the collection of remuneration benchmarking information and high earners information have been implemented through SUP 16 Annex 33AR and SUP 16 Annex 34AR. The Guidelines can be found at http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-the-remuneration-benchmarking-exercise and http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-the-data-collection-exercise-regarding-high-earners..
  3. (3) [deleted]
  • 07/11/2014

SYSC 19A.1.6A

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in General Organisational Requirements 2.1 of the PRA Rulebook.
  2. (2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the CRD which relate to remuneration. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors published Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices on 10 December 2010. Provisions of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3115) together with the European Banking Authority's Guidelines to article 75(1) and (3) of the CRD relating to the collection of remuneration benchmarking information and high earners information have been implemented through the Remuneration Reporting Requirements Part of the PRA Rulebook. The Guidelines can be found at http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-guidelines-to-streamline-data-collection-on-remuneration-practices
  • 02/04/2015

Notifications to the appropriate regulator

SYSC 19A.1.7

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) The Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the appropriate regulator expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements).
  2. (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of other members of a group and would include each of the following:
    1. (a) significant breaches of the Remuneration Code, including any breach of a rule to which the detailed provisions on voiding and recovery in SYSC 19A Annex 1 apply;
    2. (b) any proposed remuneration policies, procedures or practices which could:
      1. (i) have a significant adverse impact on the firms reputation; or
      2. (ii) affect the firms ability to continue to provide adequate services to its customers and which could result in serious detriment to a customer of the firm; or
      3. (iii) result in serious financial consequences to the financial system or to other firms;
    3. (c) any proposed changes to remuneration policies, practices or procedures which could have a significant impact on the firms risk profile or resources;
    4. (d) fraud, errors and other irregularities described in SUP 15.3.17 R which may suggest weaknesses in, or be motivated by, the firms remuneration policies, procedures or practices.
  3. (3) Such notifications should be made immediately the firm becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests such circumstances have occurred, may have occurred or may occur in the foreseeable future.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.2

General requirement

  • 01/01/2011

Remuneration policies must promote effective risk management

SYSC 19A.2.1

handbook-rule

A firm must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.

[Note: article 74(1) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.2.2

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) If a firm's remuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.
  2. (2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should have regard to applicable good practice on remuneration and corporate governance, such as guidelines on executive contracts and severance produced by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). In considering the risks arising from its remuneration policies, a firm will also need to take into account its statutory duties in relation to equal pay and non-discrimination.
  3. (3) As with other aspects of a firm's systems and controls, in accordance with SYSC 4.1.2 remuneration policies, procedures and practices must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the common platform firm's activities. What a firm must do in order to comply with the Remuneration Code will therefore vary. For example, while the Remuneration Code refers to a firm's remuneration committee and risk management function, it may be appropriate for the governing body of a smaller firm to act as the remuneration committee, and for the firm not to have a separate risk management function.
  4. (4) The principles in the Remuneration Code are used by the appropriate regulator to assess the quality of a firm's remuneration policies and whether they encourage excessive risk-taking by a firm's employees.
  5. (5) The appropriate regulator may also ask remuneration committees to provide the appropriate regulator with evidence of how well the firm's remuneration policies meet the Remuneration Code's principles, together with plans for improvement where there is a shortfall. The appropriate regulator also expects relevant firms to use the principles in assessing their exposure to risks arising from their remuneration policies as part of the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP).
  6. (6) The Remuneration Code is principally concerned with the risks created by the way remuneration arrangements are structured, not with the absolute amount of remuneration, which is generally a matter for firms' remuneration committees.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.2.2A

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) If a firm's remuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management.
  2. (2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the Remuneration Code, a firm should have regard to applicable good practice on remuneration and corporate governance, such as guidelines on executive contracts and severance produced by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). In considering the risks arising from its remuneration policies, a firm will also need to take into account its statutory duties in relation to equal pay and non-discrimination.
  3. (3) As with other aspects of a firm's systems and controls, in accordance with General Organisational Requirement 2.2 of the PRA Rulebook, remuneration policies, procedures and practices must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the common platform firm's activities. What a firm must do in order to comply with the Remuneration Code will therefore vary. For example, while the Remuneration Code refers to a firm's remuneration committee and risk management function, it may be appropriate for the governing body of a smaller firm to act as the remuneration committee, and for the firm not to have a separate risk management function.
  4. (4) The principles in the Remuneration Code are used by the appropriate regulator to assess the quality of a firm's remuneration policies and whether they encourage excessive risk-taking by a firm's employees.
  5. (5) The appropriate regulator may also ask remuneration committees to provide the appropriate regulator with evidence of how well the firm's remuneration policies meet the Remuneration Code's principles, together with plans for improvement where there is a shortfall. The appropriate regulator also expects relevant firms to use the principles in assessing their exposure to risks arising from their remuneration policies as part of the internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP).
  6. (6) The Remuneration Code is principally concerned with the risks created by the way remuneration arrangements are structured, not with the absolute amount of remuneration, which is generally a matter for firms' remuneration committees.
  • 02/04/2015

SYSC 19A.2.3

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only in relation to certain categories of employee. But the appropriate regulator would expect firms, in complying with the Remuneration Code general requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.
  2. (2) In particular, the appropriate regulator considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19A.3.40 R to SYSC 19A.3.43 G).
  3. (3) The appropriate regulator would also expect firms to apply at least the principles relating to risk management and risk tolerance (Remuneration Principle 1); supporting business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the firm (Remuneration Principle 2); conflicts of interest (Remuneration Principle 3); governance (Remuneration Principle 4); risk adjustment (Remuneration Principle 8); pension policy (Remuneration Principle 9); personal investment strategies (Remuneration Principle 10); payments related to early termination (Remuneration Principle 12(e)) and deferral (Remuneration Principle 12(g)) on a firm-wide basis.
  • 01/04/2013

Record-keeping

SYSC 19A.2.4

handbook-guidance
In line with the record-keeping requirements in SYSC 9, a firm should ensure that its remuneration policies, practices and procedures are clear and documented. Such policies, practices and procedures would include performance appraisal processes and decisions.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.2.4A

handbook-guidance
In line with the record-keeping requirements in the Record Keeping Part of the PRA Rulebook, a firm should ensure that its remuneration policies, practices and procedures are clear and documented. Such policies, practices and procedures would include performance appraisal processes and decisions.
  • 02/04/2015

Interpretation of references to remuneration

SYSC 19A.2.5

handbook-rule
  1. (1) In this chapter references to remuneration include remuneration paid, provided or awarded by any person to the extent that it is paid, provided or awarded in connection with employment by a firm.
  2. (2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the meaning of remuneration elsewhere in the Handbook.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.2.6

handbook-guidance
Remuneration includes, for example, payments made by a seconding organisation which is not subject to the Remuneration Code to a secondee in respect of their employment by a firm which is subject to the Remuneration Code.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3

Remuneration principles for banks, building societies and investment firms

  • 01/01/2011

Application: groups

SYSC 19A.3.1

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must apply the requirements of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels, including those subsidiaries established in a country or territory which is not an EEA State.
  2. (2) Paragraph (1) does not limit SYSC 12.1.13R (2)(dA) (which relates to the application of the Remuneration Code within UK consolidation groups and non-EEA sub-groups).

[Note: article 92(1) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.2

handbook-guidance
SYSC 12.1.13R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the appropriate regulator's view, the requirement to apply this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels (as provided for in SYSC 19A.3.1R (1)) is in line with the requirements inarticle 109(2) of CRD concerning the application of systems and controls requirements to groups (as implemented in SYSC 12.1.13 R).
  • 01/01/2014

Application: categories of staff and proportionality

SYSC 19A.3.3

handbook-rule
  1. (1) This section applies in relation to Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).
  2. (2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the remuneration principles proportionality rule).
  3. (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant firms to have a remuneration committee (SYSC 19A.3.12 R).
[Note: article 92(2) of CRD]
[Note: In addition to the guidance in this section which relates to the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FSA gave guidance on the division of firms into categories for the purpose of providing a framework for the operation of the remuneration principles proportionality rule. This guidance has been adopted by the FCA and is available in the FCA website at www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/finalised-guidance/remuneration-code]
  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.4

handbook-rule

Remuneration Code staff comprises categories of staff including senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on the firm's risk profile.

[Note: article 92(2) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.5

handbook-rule

A firm must:

  1. (1) maintain a record of its Remuneration Code staff in accordance with the general record-keeping requirements (SYSC 9); and
  2. (2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.5A

handbook-rule

A firm must:

  1. (1) maintain a record of its Remuneration Code staff in accordance with the general record-keeping requirements in the Record Keeping Part of the PRA Rulebook; and
  2. (2) take reasonable steps to ensure that its Remuneration Code staff understand the implications of their status as such, including the potential for remuneration which does not comply with certain requirements of the Remuneration Code to be rendered void and recoverable by the firm.
  • 02/04/2015

SYSC 19A.3.6

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) In the appropriate regulator's view:
    1. (a) a firm's staff includes its employees;
    2. (b) a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm's Remuneration Code staff;
    3. (c) the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
    4. (d) firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply in relation to their own organisational structure (as the description of suggested business lines in the first row may be most appropriate to a firm which deals on its own account to a significant extent);
    5. (e) firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
    6. (f) a firm should treat a person as being Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
  2. [Note: The FSA gave guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance has been adopted by the FCA and is available in the FCA website at www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/finalised-guidance/remuneration-code]
  3. (2)
  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 1: Risk management and risk tolerance

SYSC 19A.3.7

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the firm.

[Note: article 92(2)(a) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 2: Supporting business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the firm

SYSC 19A.3.8

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the firm.

[Note: article 92(2)(b) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 3: Avoiding conflicts of interest

SYSC 19A.3.9

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that its remuneration policy includes measures to avoid conflicts of interest.

[Note: article 92(2)(b) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 4: Governance

SYSC 19A.3.10

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that its management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation.

[Note: article 92(2)(c) of CRD and Standard 1 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.11

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function.

[Note: article 92(2)(d) of CRD and Standard 1 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.12

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A CRR firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee.
  2. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.
  3. (3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the firm.
  4. (4) The remuneration committee must be responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk and risk management of the firm and which are to be taken by the management body.
  5. (5) When preparing such decisions, the remuneration committee must take into account the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the firm and the public interest.
[Note: article 95 of CRD and Standard 1 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
[Note: The guidance referred to in the Note to SYSC 19A.3.3 R also gives guidance on proportionality in relation to remuneration committees.]
  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.12A

handbook-rule

A firm that maintains a website must explain on the website how it complies with the Remuneration Code.

[Note: article 96 of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.13

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system.
  2. (2) The governing body and any remuneration committee are responsible for ensuring that the firm's remuneration policy complies with the Remuneration Code and where relevant should take into account relevant guidance, such as that issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
  3. (3) The periodic review of the implementation of the remuneration policy should assess compliance with the Remuneration Code.
  4. (4) Guidance on what the supervisory function might involve is set out in SYSC 4.3.3 G.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.13A

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system.
  2. (2) The governing body and any remuneration committee are responsible for ensuring that the firm's remuneration policy complies with the Remuneration Code and where relevant should take into account relevant guidance, such as that issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
  3. (3) The periodic review of the implementation of the remuneration policy should assess compliance with the Remuneration Code.
  4. (4) Guidance on what the supervisory function might involve is set out in paragraph 2.8 of the PRA's Supervisory Statement: internal governance.
  • 02/04/2015

Remuneration Principle 5: Control functions

SYSC 19A.3.14

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:

  1. (1) are independent from the business units they oversee;
  2. (2) have appropriate authority; and
  3. (3) are remunerated:
    1. (a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and
    2. (b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.

[Note: article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.15

handbook-evidential-provisions
  1. (1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.
  2. (2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish contravention of the rule on employees engaged in control functions having appropriate authority (SYSC 19A.3.14R (2)).
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.16

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that the remuneration of the senior officers in risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in SYSC 19A.3.12 R, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.

[Note: article 92(2)(f) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.17

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and compliance) and human resources. It is good practice to seek input from a firm's human resources function when setting remuneration for other business areas.
  2. (2) The need to avoid undue influence is particularly important where employees from the control functions are embedded in other business areas. This Remuneration Principle does not prevent the views of other business areas being sought as an appropriate part of the assessment process.
  3. (3) The appropriate regulator would generally expect the ratio of the potential variable component of remuneration to the fixed component of remuneration to be significantly lower for employees in risk management and compliance functions than for employees in other business areas whose potential bonus is a significant proportion of their remuneration. Firms should nevertheless ensure that the total remuneration package offered to those employees is sufficient to attract and retain staff with the skills, knowledge and expertise to discharge those functions. The requirement that the method of determining the remuneration of relevant persons involved in the compliance function must not compromise their objectivity or be likely to do so also applies (see SYSC 6.1.4 R (4)).
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.17A

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and compliance) and human resources. It is good practice to seek input from a firm's human resources function when setting remuneration for other business areas.
  2. (2) The need to avoid undue influence is particularly important where employees from the control functions are embedded in other business areas. This Remuneration Principle does not prevent the views of other business areas being sought as an appropriate part of the assessment process.
  3. (3) The appropriate regulator would generally expect the ratio of the potential variable component of remuneration to the fixed component of remuneration to be significantly lower for employees in risk management and compliance functions than for employees in other business areas whose potential bonus is a significant proportion of their remuneration. Firms should nevertheless ensure that the total remuneration package offered to those employees is sufficient to attract and retain staff with the skills, knowledge and expertise to discharge those functions. The requirement that the method of determining the remuneration of relevant persons involved in the compliance function must not compromise their objectivity or be likely to do so also applies (see Compliance and Internal Audit 2.4(4) of the PRA Rulebook).
  • 02/04/2015

Remuneration Principle 6: Remuneration and capital

SYSC 19A.3.18

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that total variable remuneration does not limit the firm's ability to strengthen its capital base.

[Note: article 94(1)(c) of CRD and Standard 3 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.19

handbook-guidance
This Remuneration Principle underlines the link between a firm's variable remuneration costs and the need to manage its capital base, including forward-looking capital planning measures. Where a firm needs to strengthen its capital base, its variable remuneration arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to allow it to direct the necessary resources towards capital building.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 7: Exceptional government intervention

SYSC 19A.3.20

handbook-rule

A firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention must ensure that:

  1. (1) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenues when it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;
  2. (2) it restructures remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including when appropriate establishing limits to the remuneration of members of its management body; and
  3. (3) no variable remuneration is paid to members of its management body unless this is justified.

[Note: article 93 of CRD and Standard 10 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.21

handbook-guidance
The appropriate regulator would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to members of the management body of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to members of the management body who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 8: Profit-based measurement and risk adjustment

SYSC 19A.3.22

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must ensure that any measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components:
    1. (a) includes adjustments for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost and quantity of the capital and the liquidity required; and
    2. (b) takes into account the need for consistency with the timing and likelihood of the firm receiving potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings.
  2. (2) A firm must ensure that the allocation of variable remuneration components within the firm also takes into account all types of current and future risks.

[Note: article 94(1)(j), (k) of CRD and Standard 4 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.23

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques, and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose.
  2. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those most appropriate to its circumstances. Common measures include those based on economic profit or economic capital. Whichever technique is chosen, the full range of future risks should be covered. The appropriate regulator expects a firm to be able to provide it with details of all adjustments that the firm has made under a formulaic approach.
  3. (3) The appropriate regulator expects that a firm will apply qualitative judgments and common sense in the final decision about the performance-related components of variable remuneration pools.
  4. (4) A firm's governing body (or remuneration committee where appropriate) should take the lead in determining the measures to be used. It should offer the appropriate checks and balances to prevent inappropriate manipulation of the measures used. It should consult closely and frequently with the firm's risk management functions, in particular those relating to operational, market, credit and liquidity risk.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.24

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Long-term incentive plans should be treated as pools of variable remuneration. Many common measures of performance for long-term incentive plans, such as earnings per share (EPS), are not adjusted for longer-term risk factors. Total shareholder return (TSR), another common measure, includes in its measurement dividend distributions, which can also be based on unadjusted earnings data. If incentive plans mature within a two to four year period and are based on EPS or TSR, strategies can be devised to boost EPS or TSR during the life of the plan, to the detriment of the true longer-term health of a firm. For example, increasing leverage is a technique which can be used to boost EPS and TSR. Firms should take account of these factors when developing risk-adjustment methods.
  2. (2) Firms that have long-term incentive plans should structure them with vesting subject to appropriate performance conditions, and at least half of the award vesting after not less than five years and the remainder after not less than three years.
  3. (3) Long-term incentive plan awards may be included in the calculation of the deferred portion of variable remuneration only if upside incentives are adequately balanced by downside adjustments. The valuation of the award should be based on its value when the award is granted, and determined using an appropriate technique.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.25

handbook-rule
Assessments of financial performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components must be based principally on profits.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.26

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Performance measures based primarily on revenues or turnover are unlikely to pay sufficient regard to the quality of business undertaken or services provided. Profits are a better measure provided they are adjusted for risk, including future risks not adequately captured by accounting profits.
  2. (2) Management accounts should provide profit data at such levels within the firm's structure as to enable a firm to see as accurate a picture of contributions of relevant staff to a firm's performance as is reasonably practicable. If revenue or turnover is used as a component in performance assessment, processes should be in place to ensure that the quality of business undertaken or services provided and their appropriateness for clients are taken into account.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.27

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that its total variable remuneration is generally considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the firm occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned , including through malus or clawback arrangements.

[Note: article 94(1)(n) of CRD and Standard 5 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.28

handbook-guidance
Where a firm makes a loss the appropriate regulator would generally expect no variable remuneration to be awarded. Variable remuneration may nevertheless be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 9: Pension policy

SYSC 19A.3.29

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that:

  1. (1) its pension policy is in line with its business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests;
  2. (2) when an employee leaves the firm before retirement, any discretionary pension benefits are held by the firm for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47R (1); and
  3. (3) when an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits are paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47R (1) and subject to a five-year retention period.

[Note: article 94(1)(o) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 10: Personal investment strategies

SYSC 19A.3.30

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must ensure that its employees undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- or liability-related contracts of insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.
  2. (2) A firm must maintain effective arrangements designed to ensure that employees comply with their undertaking.

[Note: article 94(1)(p) of CRD and Standard 14 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.31

handbook-guidance
In the appropriate regulator's view, circumstances in which a person will be using a personal hedging strategy include entering into an arrangement with a third party under which the third party will make payments, directly or indirectly, to that person that are linked to or commensurate with the amounts by which the person's remuneration is subject to reductions.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 11: Non-compliance with the Remuneration Code

SYSC 19A.3.32

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate non-compliance with the Remuneration Code.

[Note: article 94(1)(q) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 12: Remuneration structures - introduction

SYSC 19A.3.33

handbook-guidance
Remuneration Principle 12 consists of a series of rules, evidential provisions and guidance relating to remuneration structures.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.34

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule, the appropriate regulator does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied:
    1. (a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and
    2. (b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.
  2. (2) The rules referred to in (1) are those relating to:
    1. (a) guaranteed variable remuneration (SYSC 19A.3.40 R);
    2. (b) retained shares or other instruments (SYSC 19A.3.47 R);
    3. (c) deferral (SYSC 19A.3.49 R); and
    4. (d) performance adjustment (SYSC 19A.3.51 R).

[Note: The FSA also gave guidance on the application of certain rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance has been adopted by the FCA and is available in the FCA website at www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/finalised-guidance/remuneration-code.]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 12(a): Remuneration structures - general requirement

SYSC 19A.3.35

handbook-rule
A firm must ensure that the structure of an employee's remuneration is consistent with and promotes effective risk management.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.35A

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that the remuneration policy makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:

  1. (1) basic fixed remuneration that primarily reflects an employee's professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in the employee's job description and terms of employment; and
  2. (2) variable remuneration that reflects performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description and terms of employment and that is subject to performance adjustment in accordance with the Remuneration Code.

[Note: article 92(2)(g) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 12(b): Remuneration structures - assessment of performance

SYSC 19A.3.36

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that where remuneration is performance-related:

  1. (1) the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of:
    1. (a) the individual;
    2. (b) the business unit concerned; and
    3. (c) the overall results of the firm; and
  2. (2) when assessing individual performance, financial as well as non-financial criteria are taken into account.

[Note: article 94(1)(a) of CRD and Standard 6 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.37

handbook-guidance
Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process and should include adherence to effective risk management and compliance with the regulatory system and with relevant overseas regulatory requirements. Poor performance as assessed by non-financial metrics such as poor risk management or other behaviours contrary to firm values can pose significant risks for a firm and should, as appropriate, override metrics of financial performance. The performance assessment process and the importance of non-financial assessment factors in the process should be clearly explained to relevant employees and implemented. A balanced scorecard can be a good technique.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.38

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that the assessment of performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the firm and its business risks.

[Note: article 94(1)(b) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.39

handbook-guidance
The requirement for assessment of performance to be in a multi-year framework reflects the fact that profits from a firm's activities can be volatile and subject to cycles. The financial performance of firms and individual employees can be exaggerated as a result. Performance assessment on a moving average of results can be a good way of meeting this requirement. However, other techniques such as good quality risk adjustment and deferral of a sufficiently large proportion of remuneration may also be useful.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 12(c): Remuneration structures - guaranteed variable remuneration

SYSC 19A.3.40

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that guaranteed variable remuneration is not part of prospective remuneration plans. A firm must not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration unless:

  1. (1) it is exceptional;
  2. (2) it occurs in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff;
  3. (3) the firm has a sound and strong capital base; and
  4. (4) it is limited to the first year of service.

[Note: article 94(1)(d) and (e) of CRD and Standard 11 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.40A

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that remuneration packages relating to compensation for, or buy out from, an employee's contracts in previous employment align with the long term interests of the firm and are subject to appropriate retention, deferral and performance and clawback arrangements.

[Note: article 94(1)(i) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.41

handbook-evidential-provisions
  1. (1) A firm should not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration in the context of hiring new Remuneration Code staff (X) unless:
    1. (a) it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the remuneration is not more generous in either its amount or terms (including any deferral or retention periods) than the variable remuneration awarded or offered by Xs previous employer; and
    2. (b) it is subject to appropriate performance adjustment requirements.
  2. (2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as tending to establish contravention of the rule on guaranteed variable remuneration (SYSC 19A.3.40 R).
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.42

handbook-guidance
Guaranteed variable remuneration should be subject to the same deferral criteria as other forms of variable remuneration awarded by the firm.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.43

handbook-guidance
In the appropriate regulator's view, variable remuneration can be awarded to Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The appropriate regulator considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals required in accordance with Principle 11 and the general notification requirements in SUP 15.3.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 12(d): Remuneration structures - ratios between fixed and variable components of total remuneration

SYSC 19A.3.44

handbook-rule

A firm must set appropriate ratios between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration and ensure that:

  1. (1) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced;
  2. (2) the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; and
  3. (3) subject to SYSC 19A.3.44A R, the ratio of the variable component of total remuneration to the fixed component does not exceed 1:1.

[Note: Paragraph 23(l) of Annex V to the Banking Consolidation Directive]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.44A

handbook-rule

A firm may set a ratio between the fixed and the variable components of total remuneration that exceeds 1:1 provided the ratio:

  1. (1) does not exceed 1:2; and
  2. (2) is approved by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm in accordance with SYSC 19A.3.44B R.

[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.44B

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that any approval by the shareholders or owners or members of the firm of a ratio that exceeds 1:1 is carried out in accordance with the following procedure:

  1. (1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all shareholders or owners or members of the firm that the firm intends to seek approval of a ratio that exceeds 1:1;
  2. (2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all shareholders or owners or members of the firm giving the reasons for, and the scope of, the approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base;
  3. (3) the firm must, without delay, inform the appropriate regulator of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed ratio and the reasons therefor and must demonstrate to the appropriate regulator that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the firm's obligations under the CRD and the CRR, having regard in particular to the firm's own funds obligations;
  4. (4) the firm must ensure that employees who have an interest in the proposed higher ratio are not allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the firm in respect of the approval sought; and
  5. (5) the higher ratio is approved by a majority of:
    1. (a) at least 66% of shareholders or owners or members of the firm, provided that at least 50% of the shareholders or owners or members are represented; or
    2. (b) at least 75% of shareholders or owners or members of the firm if less than 50% of the shareholders, members or owners are represented.

[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.44C

handbook-rule

A firm must notify without delay the appropriate regulator of the decisions taken by its shareholders or members or owners including any approved higher maximum ratio.

[Note: article 94(1)(g)(ii) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.44D

handbook-rule

A firm may apply a discount rate to a maximum of 25% of an employee's total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years.

[Note: article 94(1)(g)(iii) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2014

Remuneration Principle 12(e): Remuneration structures - payments related to early termination

SYSC 19A.3.45

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and are designed in a way that does not reward failure or misconduct.

[Note: article 94(1)(h) of CRD and Standard 12 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.46

handbook-guidance

Firms should review existing contractual payments related to termination of employment with a view to ensuring that these are payable only where there is a clear basis for concluding that they are consistent with the Remuneration Code general requirement.

[Note: Standard 12 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 12(f): Remuneration structures - retained shares or other instruments

SYSC 19A.3.47

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must ensure that a substantial portion, which is at least 50%, of any variable remuneration consists of an appropriate balance of:
    1. (a) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the firm concerned, or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments in the case of a non-listed firm; and
    2. (b) where possible other instruments which are eligible as Additional Tier 1 instruments or are eligible as Tier 2 instruments or other instruments that can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the firm as a going concern and are appropriate for use as variable remuneration.
  2. (2) The instruments in (1) must be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the firm.
  3. (3) This rule applies to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with SYSC 19A.3.49 R and the portion not deferred.

[Note: article 94(1)(l) of CRD and Standard 8 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.48

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) The Committee of European Banking Supervisors has given guidance on the interpretation of the Directive provision transposed by SYSC 19A.3.47R (3). Its Guidelines provide that this requirement means that the 50% minimum threshold for instruments must be applied equally to the non-deferred and the deferred components; in other words, firms must apply the same chosen ratio between instruments and cash for their total variable remuneration to both the upfront and deferred components. (Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices, 10 December 2010, paragraph 133.)
  2. (2) This simplified example illustrates the operation of (1). The variable remuneration of a material risk taker (X) is 100, and by SYSC 19A.3.49R (3) X is required to defer 60%. Xs upfront component is 40 and Xs deferred component is 60. At least 20 of Xs upfront component, and at least 30 of Xs deferred component, must be in instruments referred to in SYSC 19A.3.47R (1).
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 12(g): Remuneration structures - deferral

SYSC 19A.3.49

handbook-rule
  1. (1) A firm must not award, pay or provide a variable remuneration component unless a substantial portion of it, which is at least 40%, is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years.
  2. (2) Remuneration under (1) must vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis.
  3. (3) In the case of a variable remuneration component:
    1. (a) of a particularly high amount, or
    2. (b) payable to a director of a firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities;
  4. at least 60% of the amount must be deferred.
  5. (4) Paragraph (3)(b) does not apply to a non-executive director.
  6. (5) The length of the deferral period must be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the employee in question.
  7. [Note: article 94(1)(m) of CRD and Standards 6 and 7 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
  8. (6) 500,000 is a particularly high amount for the purpose of (3)(a).
  9. (7) Paragraph (6) is without prejudice to the possibility of lower sums being considered a particularly high amount.
  • 01/01/2014

SYSC 19A.3.50

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.
  2. (2) The appropriate regulator would generally expect a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally rise with the ratio of variable remuneration to fixed remuneration and with the amount of variable remuneration. While any variable remuneration component of 500,000 or more paid to Remuneration Code staff must be subject to 60% deferral, firms should also consider whether lesser amounts should be considered to be 'particularly high' taking account, for example, of whether there are significant differences within Remuneration Code staff in the levels of variable remuneration paid.
  • 01/04/2013

Remuneration Principle 12(h): Remuneration structures - performance adjustment, etc.

SYSC 19A.3.51

handbook-rule

A firm must ensure that:

  1. (1) any variable remuneration, including a deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the firm as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the firm, the business unit and the individual concerned;
  2. (2) any variable remuneration is subject to clawback, such that it is not awarded save where an amount corresponding to it can be recovered from the individual by the firm if the recovery is justified on the basis of the circumstances described in SYSC 19A.3.51AR (3) and SYSC 19A.3.51B R; and
  3. [Note: article 94(1)(n) of CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
  4. (3) variable remuneration is subject to clawback for a period of at least 7 years from the date on which it is awarded.
  5. [Note: article 94(1)(n) of CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards]

[Note: This provision is shown with PRA changes made by PRA 2014/22. To see the FCA provision, select the date 31/12/14 from the date picker above]

  • 01/01/2015

SYSC 19A.3.51A

handbook-rule

A firm must:

  1. (1) [deleted]
  2. (2) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and
  3. (3) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee:
    1. (a) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm;
    2. (b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.

[Note: This provision is shown with PRA changes made by PRA 2014/22. To see the FCA provision, select the date 31/12/14 from the date picker above]

[Note: article 94(1)(n) of CRD]

  • 01/01/2015

SYSC 19A.3.51B

handbook-rule

A firm must make all reasonable efforts to recover an appropriate amount corresponding to some or all vested variable remuneration where either of the following circumstances arise during the period in which clawback applies:

  1. (1) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or
  2. (2) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.

A firm must take into account all relevant factors (including, where the circumstances described in (b) arise, the proximity of the employee to the failure of risk-management in question and the employee's level of responsibility) in deciding whether and to what extent it is reasonable to seek recovery of any or all of their vested variable remuneration.

  • 01/01/2015

SYSC 19A.3.52

handbook-evidential-provisions
  1. (1) A firm should reduce unvested deferred variable remuneration when, as a minimum:
    1. (a) there is reasonable evidence of employee misbehaviour or material error; or
    2. (b) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance; or
    3. (c) the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management.
  2. (2) For performance adjustment purposes, awards of deferred variable remuneration made in shares or other non-cash instruments should provide the ability for the firm to reduce the number of shares or other non-cash instruments.
  3. (3) Contravention of (1) or (2) may be relied on as tending to establish contravention of the rule on performance adjustment (SYSC 19A.3.51 R).
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.53

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
  2. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The appropriate regulator may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate the adjustments.
  • 01/04/2013

Effect of breaches of the Remuneration Principles

SYSC 19A.3.53A

handbook-rule
SYSC 19A Annex 1 makes provision about voiding and recovery.
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A.3.54

handbook-rule
  1. (1) Subject to (1A) to (3), the rules in SYSC 19A Annex 1.1R to 1.4R apply in relation to the prohibitions on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the ways specified in:
    1. (a) SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration);
    2. (b) SYSC 19A.3.49 R (non-deferred variable remuneration);
    3. (c) SYSC 19A.3.51R (2) (performance adjustment - clawback); and
    4. (d) SYSC 19A Annex 1.7R (replacing payments recovered or property transferred).
  2. [Note: This provision is shown with PRA changes made by PRA 2014/22. To see the FCA provision, select the date 31/12/14 from the date picker above]
  3. (1A) Paragraph (1) applies only to those prohibitions as they apply in relation to a firm that satisfies at least one of the conditions set out in (1B) and (1D).
  4. (1B) Condition 1 is that the firm is a UK bank, a building society, a designated investment firm, or a relevant IFPRU 730k firm that has relevant total assets exceeding £50 billion.
  5. (1C) [deleted]
  6. (1D) Condition 2 is that the firm:
    1. (a) is a full credit institution, a designated investment firm, a relevant IFPRU 730k firm or a relevant third country IFPRU 730k firm; and
    2. (b) is part of a group containing a firm that has relevant total assets exceeding £50 billion and that is a UK bank, a building society, a designated investment firm or a relevant IFPRU 730k firm.
  7. (1E) In this rule:
    1. (a) a "relevant IFPRU 730k firm" is any IFPRU 730k firm that is not a limited activity firm or a limited licence firm;
    2. (b) a "relevant third country IFPRU 730k firm" is any third country IFPRU 730k firm that is not a limited activity firm or a limited licence firm; and
    3. (c) "relevant total assets" means the arithmetic mean of the firm's total assets as set out in its balance sheet on its last three accounting reference dates.
  8. (2) This rule does not apply in relation to the prohibition on Remuneration Code staff being remunerated in the way specified in SYSC 19A.3.40 R (guaranteed variable remuneration) if both the conditions in paragraphs (2) and (3) of that rule are met.
  9. (3) This rule does not apply in relation to Remuneration Code staff (X) in respect of whom both the following conditions are satisfied:
    1. (a) Condition 1 is that Xs variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and
    2. (b) Condition 2 is that Xs total remuneration is no more than 500,000.
  10. (4) In relation to (3):
    1. (a) references to remuneration are to remuneration awarded or paid in respect of the relevant performance year;
    2. (b) the amount of any remuneration is:
      1. (i) if it is money, its amount when awarded;
      2. (ii) otherwise, whichever of the following is greatest: its value to the recipient when awarded; its market value when awarded; and the cost of providing it;
    3. (c) where remuneration is, when awarded, subject to any condition, restriction or other similar provision which causes the amount of the remuneration to be less than it otherwise would be, that condition, restriction or provision is to be ignored in arriving at its value; and
    4. (d) it is to be assumed that the member of Remuneration Code staff will remain so for the duration of the relevant performance year.
  • 01/01/2015

SYSC 19A.3.55

handbook-guidance
  1. (1) Sections 137H and 137I of the Act enables the appropriate regulator to make rules that render void any provision of an agreement that contravenes specified prohibitions in the Remuneration Code, and that provide for the recovery of any payment made, or other property transferred, in pursuance of such a provision. SYSC 19A.3.53A R and SYSC 19A.3.54 R (together with SYSC 19A Annex 1) are such rules and render void provisions of an agreement that contravene the specified prohibitions on guaranteed variable remuneration, non-deferred variable remuneration and replacing payments recovered or property transferred. This is an exception to the general position set out in section 138E(2) of the Act that a contravention of a rule does not make any transaction void or unenforceable.
  2. (2) [deleted]
  • 01/04/2013

SYSC 19A Annex 1

Detailed provisions on voiding and recovery (SYSC 19A.3.53AR and SYSC 19A.3.54R)

  • 01/01/2012

  • 01/04/2013