ENF 2
Information gathering and investigation powers
ENF 2.1
Application and purpose
- 01/12/2004
Application
ENF 2.1.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.1.1A
See Notes
- 01/07/2005
Purpose
ENF 2.1.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.2
Introduction
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.2.1
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.2.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3
The FSA's powers to gather information and investigate
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Requiring information and documents from firms
ENF 2.3.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Reports on firms by skilled persons
ENF 2.3.8
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.9
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.10
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.11
See Notes
- 27/04/2002
General investigations of firms and appointedrepresentatives
ENF 2.3.12
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.13
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
Investigations of specific contraventions, offences and other matters
ENF 2.3.14
See Notes
Section 168 of the Act (Appointment of persons to carry out investigations in particular cases) relates to the conduct of investigations into certain specified contraventions, offences or other matters. The FSA's powers to appoint investigators are contained in section 168(3) and (5) and the circumstances in which it can do so are listed in section 168(1), (2) and (4) of the Act.
- (1) Under section 168(1) and (3) the FSA may appoint one or more competent persons to carry out an investigation on its behalf if it appears to the FSA that there are circumstances suggesting that:
- (a) a person may have breached regulations made under section 142 of the Act (Insurance business: regulations supplementing FSA's rules); or
- (b) a person may be guilty of an offence under section 177 (Offences), 191 (Offences under Part XII), 346 (Provision of false or misleading information to auditor or actuary) or 398(1) (Misleading the FSA: residual cases) of the Act or under Schedule 4 to the Act (Treaty Rights).
- (2) Under section 168(2) and (3) the FSA may appoint one or more competent persons to carry out an investigation on its behalf if it appears to the FSA that there are circumstances suggesting that:
- (a) an offence under section 24(1) (False claims to be authorised or exempt) or 397 (Misleading statements and practices) of the Act or under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 may have been committed; or
- (b) there may have been a breach of the general prohibition; or
- (c) there may have been a contravention of section 21 (Restrictions on financial promotion) or 238 (Restrictions on promotion of collective investment schemes) of the Act; or
- (d) market abuse may have taken place.
- (3) Under section 168(4) and (5) the FSA may appoint one or more competent persons to carry out an investigation on its behalf if it appears to the FSA that there are circumstances suggesting that:
- (a) a firm may have breached the requirement for permission in section 20 of the Act (Authorised persons acting without permission); or
- (b) a person may be guilty of an offence under the Money Laundering Regulations; or
- (c) a firm may have breached a rule made by the FSA; or
- (d) an individual may not be a fit and proper person to perform functions in relation to a regulated activity carried on by an authorised or exempt person; or
- (e) an individual may have performed or agreed to perform a function in breach of a prohibition order; or
- (f) a firm or an exempt person may have failed to comply with section 56(6) of the Act (Prohibition orders); or
- (g) a firm may have failed to comply with section 59(1) or (2) of the Act (Approval for particular arrangements); or
- (h) a person to whom the FSA has given its approval under section 59 may not be a fit and proper person to perform the function to which that approval relates; or
- (i) a person may be guilty of misconduct for the purposes of section 66 of the Act.
- (4) As a result of regulation 12 of the ECD Regulations, the FSA may also appoint investigators under section 168(4)(c) and (5) where it appears to the FSA that there are circumstances suggesting that an incoming ECA provider, whether a firm or not, may have breached a requirement imposed by the FSA under those regulations.
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.3.15
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
Investigations in support of overseas regulators
ENF 2.3.16
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
- 01/12/2004
Investigations into collective investment schemes
ENF 2.3.18
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.19
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.20
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.3.21
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4
Powers of FSA investigators
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers of section 167 investigators
ENF 2.4.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers of section 168(1) and (4) investigators
ENF 2.4.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers of section 168(2) investigators
ENF 2.4.8
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers of section 169 investigators
ENF 2.4.9
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers common to section 167, 168(1), (2) and (4), and 169 investigators
ENF 2.4.10
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.11
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.4.12
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Powers of section 284 investigators
ENF 2.4.13
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.5
The FSA's policy on exercising its powers: firms, approvedpersons, and others
- 01/12/2004
Introduction
ENF 2.5.1
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
Requiring information and documents under section 165 of the Act
ENF 2.5.2
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.5.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Reports by skilledpersons under section 166 of the Act and investigations under sections 167 and 168 of the Act.
ENF 2.5.4
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.5.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Reports by skilled persons
ENF 2.5.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.5.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Investigations into general and specific concerns
ENF 2.5.8
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.5.9
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
ENF 2.5.10
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.5.11
See Notes
- 21/08/2002
Preliminary Findings Letter
ENF 2.5.12
See Notes
- 27/04/2002
ENF 2.5.13
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.5.14
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.5.15
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.6
The FSA's policy on investigations into suspected market misconduct
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.6.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.6.2
See Notes
When considering whether to use its powers to conduct formal investigations into market misconduct, the FSA will take into account a number of factors. These will include:
- (1) the seriousness of its concerns, including the effect of the misconduct on consumers or market confidence;
- (2) the nature of the possible contravention, including the type of market involved, and the duration and frequency of the possible contravention;
- (3) the context of the possible contravention; for example, where the behaviour in question happened or is happening in the context of a takeover bid and, in the FSA's opinion, any investigation may materially affect the timetable or outcome of that bid, the FSA will consult the Takeover Panel and will give due weight to its views; and
- (4) whether another regulatory authority is in a position to investigate and deal with the matters of concern.
- (a) As far as a recognised investment exchange or recognised clearing house is concerned, the FSA will consider the extent to which the relevant exchange or clearing house has adequate and appropriate powers to investigate and deal with the matters of concern itself. The FSA will consult with the relevant exchange or clearing house and give due weight to its views. Where appropriate, the FSA may use its own powers under section 128 of the Act (Suspension of investigations) to prevent a recognised investment exchange or recognised clearing house from starting an investigation or to limit, stop or suspend an existing inquiry.
- (b) As far as the Takeover Panel is concerned, as regards market abuse, the cases in which the FSA expects to take action against a person with Takeover Code responsibilities are limited, as ENF 14.9 (Action involving other UK regulatory authorities) makes clear. The FSA does not therefore expect to use relevant investigative powers unless one of the circumstances in ENF 14.9.6 G applies. Further, unless one of the following exceptions applies, the FSA will not start any investigation into behaviour that has happened or is happening in the context of a takeover bid while that bid is current. The exceptions are where: (i) the case falls within ENF 14.9.7 G, or (ii) the person whose behaviour is to be investigated is not a person who has responsibilities under the Takeover Code.
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7
The FSA's policy on investigations into unauthorised business
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.7.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8
The FSA's policy for exercising its power to conduct investigations to assist overseas authorities
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.8.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.9
The FSA's policy on investigations into collective investment schemes under section 284
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.9.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.9.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.10
Protected items, banking confidentiality, and admissibility
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.10.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Protected items
ENF 2.10.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Banking confidentiality
ENF 2.10.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Admissibility of statements
ENF 2.10.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.10.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11
The FSA's policy on investigators and control of investigations
- 01/12/2004
Powers of the investigators
ENF 2.11.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Control and direction of the investigation
ENF 2.11.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.8
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.11.9
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12
The FSA's policy on notification to the person under investigation
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.12.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13
Publicity
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Publicity during investigations
ENF 2.13.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Publicity following an investigation
ENF 2.13.8
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.9
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.10
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.13.11
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.14
The FSA's policy: interviews and interview procedures
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.14.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Voluntary Interviews
ENF 2.14.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Compulsory interviews
ENF 2.14.3
See Notes
Where the FSA does require a person to answer questions in interview, using its compulsory powers, it will:
- (1) allow that person (whether or not he is the subject of the investigation) to be accompanied by a legal adviser, if he wishes;
- (2) give the person an appropriate warning and an explanation of the limited use that can be made of his answers in criminal proceedings against him, or in proceedings in which the FSA seeks a penalty for market abuse under Part VIII of the Act (Penalties for Market Abuse); and
- (3) give the person a record of the interview (in most cases this will be an audio tape recording).
- 01/12/2004
Interviews under caution
ENF 2.14.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.14.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.14.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.14.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.15
The FSA's powers to enforce requirements
- 01/12/2004
Search warrants
ENF 2.15.1
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.15.2
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.15.3
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.15.4
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Prosecutions
ENF 2.15.5
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2.15.6
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
Certification procedure
ENF 2.15.7
See Notes
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2 Annex 1
Information gathering and investigation powers
- 01/12/2004
See Notes
Purpose, status and application of the guidelines | |||
1. | These guidelines have been agreed by the following bodies ("the
agencies"): • the Financial Services Authority ("the FSA"); • the Serious Fraud Office ("the SFO"); • the Department of Trade and Industry ("the DTI"); • the Crown Prosecution Service ("the CPS"); • the Association of Chief Police Officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland ("ACPO"); • the Crown Office; • the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland ("the DPP(NI)"); • the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland ("ACPO(S)"). | ||
2. | The guidelines are intended to assist the agencies when considering cases concerning financial crime and/or regulatory misconduct that are, or may be, of mutual interest to the FSA and one or more of the other agencies. Their implementation and wider points arising from them will be kept under review by the agencies who will liaise regularly. | ||
3. | The purpose of the guidelines is to set out some broad principles which the agencies agree should be applied by them in order to assist them to: | ||
(a) | decide which of them should investigate such cases; | ||
(b) | co-operate with each other, particularly in cases where more than one agency is investigating; | ||
(c) | prevent undue duplication of effort by reason of the involvement of more than one agency; | ||
(d) | prevent the subjects of proceedings being treated unfairly by reason of the unwarranted involvement of more than one agency. | ||
4. | The guidelines are intended to apply to the relationships between the FSA and the other agencies. They are not intended to apply to the relationships between those other agencies themselves where there is no FSA interest. They are not legally binding. | ||
5. | The guidelines are subject to the restrictions on disclosure of information held by the agencies. They are not intended to override them. | ||
6. | The guidelines are relevant to ACPO and ACPO(S) only in so far as they relate to investigations. Similarly, they are relevant to the CPS and the DPP(NI) only in so far as they relate to prosecutions. | ||
Commencing Investigations | |||
7. | The agencies recognise that there are areas in which they have an overlapping remit in terms of their functions and powers (the powers and functions of the agencies are set out in the Appendix to this document). The agencies will therefore endeavour to ensure that only the agency or agencies with the most appropriate functions and powers will commence investigations. | ||
8. | The agencies further recognise that in certain cases concurrent investigations may be the most quick, effective and efficient way for some cases to be dealt with. However, if an agency is considering commencing an investigation and another agency is already carrying on a related investigation or proceedings or is otherwise likely to have an interest in that investigation, best practice is for the agencies concerned to liaise and discuss which agency or agencies should take action, ie investigate, bring proceedings or otherwise deal with the matter. | ||
Indicators for deciding which agency should take action | |||
9. | The following are indicators of whether action by the FSA or one of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered in the round. | ||
(a) | Tending towards action by the FSA | ||
• | Where the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated by the FSA. | ||
• | Where the suspected conduct in question would be best dealt with by: | ||
- criminal prosecution of offences which the FSA has powers to prosecute by virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") (see Appendix paragraph 1.4) and other incidental offences; | |||
- civil proceedings under the 2000 Act (including applications for injunctions, restitution and to wind up firms carrying on regulated activities); | |||
- regulatory action which can be referred to the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (including proceedings for market abuse); and | |||
- proceedings for breaches of Part VI of the Act, of Part 6 rules or the Prospectus Rules or a provision otherwise made in accordance with the Prospectus Directive. | |||
• | Where the likely defendants are FSA authorised or approved persons. | ||
• | Where the likely defendants are issuers or sponsors of a security admitted to the official list or in relation to which an application for listing has been made | ||
• | Where there is likely to be a case for the use of FSA powers which may take immediate effect (eg powers to vary the permission of an authorised firm or to suspend listing of securities). | ||
• | Where it is likely that the investigator will be seeking assistance from overseas regulatory authorities with functions equivalent to those of the FSA. | ||
• | Where any possible criminal offences are technical or in a grey area whereas regulatory contraventions are clearly indicated. | ||
• | Where the balance of public interest is in achieving reparation for victims and prosecution is likely to damage the prospects of this. | ||
• | Where there are distinct parts of the case which are best investigated with regulatory expertise. | ||
(b) | Tending towards action by one of the other agencies | ||
• | Where serious or complex fraud is the predominant issue in the conduct in question (normally appropriate for the SFO). | ||
• | Where the suspected conduct in question would be best dealt with by: | ||
- criminal proceedings for which the FSA is not the statutory prosecutor; | |||
- proceedings for disqualification of directors under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (normally appropriate for DTI action); | |||
- winding up proceedings which FSA does not have statutory powers to bring (normally appropriate for DTI action); or | |||
- criminal proceedings in Scotland. | |||
• | Where the conduct in question concerns the abuse of limited liability status under the Companies Acts (normally appropriate for DTI action). | ||
• | Where powers of arrest are likely to be necessary. | ||
• | Where it is likely that the investigator will rely on overseas organisations (such as law enforcement agencies) with which the other agencies have liaison. | ||
• | Where action by the FSA is likely to prejudice the public interest in the prosecution of offences for which the FSA is not a statutory prosecutor. | ||
• | Where the case falls only partly within the regulated area (or criminal offences for which FSA is a statutory prosecutor) and the prospects of splitting the investigation are not good. | ||
10. | It is also best practice for the agencies involved or interested in an investigation to continue to liaise as appropriate throughout in order to keep under review the decisions as to who should investigate or bring proceedings. This is particularly so where there are material developments in the investigation that might cause the agencies to reconsider its general purpose or scope and whether additional investigation by others is called for. | ||
Conduct of concurrent investigations | |||
11. | The agencies recognise that where concurrent investigations are taking place, action taken by one agency can prejudice the investigation or subsequent proceedings brought by another agency. Consequently, it is best practice for the agencies involved in concurrent investigations to notify each other of significant developments in their investigations and of any significant steps they propose to take in the case, such as: | ||
• | interviewing a key witness; | ||
• | requiring provision of significant volumes of documents; | ||
• | executing a search warrant; or | ||
• | instituting proceedings or otherwise disposing of a matter. | ||
12. | If the agencies identify that particular action by one party might prejudice an investigation or future proceedings by another, it is desirable for the parties concerned to discuss and decide what action should be taken and by whom. In reaching these decisions, they will bear in mind how the public interest is best served overall. The examples provided in paragraph 9 above may also be used as indicators of where the overall balance of interest lies | ||
Deciding to bring proceedings | |||
13. | The agencies will consider, as necessary, and keep under review whether an investigation has reached the point where it is appropriate to commence proceedings. Where agencies are deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, they will have regard to the usual codes or guidance relevant to that decision. For example, agencies other than the DPP(NI) or the Crown Office will have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Note: Different guidance applies to the DPP(NI) and the Crown Office. All criminal proceedings in Scotland are the responsibility of the Lord Advocate. Separate arrangements have been agreed between the FSA and the Crown Office for the prosecution of offences in Scotland arising out of FSA investigations). Where they are considering whether to bring non-criminal proceedings, they will take into account whatever factors they consider relevant (for example, in the case of market abuse proceedings brought by the FSA, these are set out in paragraph 14.4 of the FSA Enforcement manual). | ||
14. | The agencies recognise that in taking a decision whether to commence proceedings, relevant factors will include: | ||
• | whether commencement of proceedings might prejudice ongoing or potential investigations or proceedings brought by other agencies; and | ||
• | whether, in the light of any proceedings being brought by another party, it is appropriate to commence separate proceedings against the person under investigation. | ||
15. | Best practice in these circumstances, therefore, is for the parties concerned to liaise before a decision is taken. | ||
Closing Cases | |||
16. | It is best practice for the agencies, at the conclusion of any investigation where it is decided that no further action need be taken, or at the conclusion of proceedings, to notify any other agencies concerned of the outcome of the investigation and/or proceedings and to provide any other helpful feedback. | ||
APPENDIX TO THE GUIDELINES ON INVESTIGATION OF CASES OF INTEREST OR CONCERN TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY AND OTHER PROSECUTING AND INVESTIGATING AGENCIES | |||
1. | The FSA | ||
1.1 | The FSA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business in the UK. Its regulatory objectives under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("the 2000 Act") are: | ||
• | market confidence; | ||
• | public awareness; | ||
• | the protection of consumers; and | ||
• | the reduction of financial crime. | ||
(NOTE: The 2000 Act repealed and replaced various enactments which conferred powers and functions on the FSA and other regulators whose functions are now carried out by the FSA. Most notable in this context are the Financial Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987. Transitional provisions under the 2000 Act permit the FSA to continue to investigate and bring proceedings for offences under the old legislation. Details of these transitional provisions are not set out in these guidelines) | |||
1.2 | The FSA's regulatory objectives as the competent authority under Part VI of the Act are: | ||
• | the protection of investors; | ||
• | access to capital; and | ||
• | investor confidence. | ||
1.3 | Under the 2000 Act the FSA has powers to investigate concerns including: | ||
• | *regulatory concerns about authorised firms and individuals employed by them; | ||
• | *suspected market abuse under s.118 of the 2000 Act; | ||
• | *suspected misleading statements and practices under s.397 of the 2000 Act; | ||
• | *suspected insider dealing under of Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993; | ||
• | suspected contraventions of the general prohibition under s.19 of the 2000 Act and related offences; | ||
• | *suspected offences under various other provisions of the 2000 Act (see below); | ||
• | suspected breaches of Part VI of the Act , of Part 6 rules or the prospectus rules or a provision otherwise made in accordance with the Prospectus Directive. | ||
The FSA's powers of information gathering and investigation are set out in Part XI of the 2000 Act and in s.97 in relation to its Part VI functions. | |||
1.4 | The FSA has power to take the following enforcement action: | ||
• | discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons under s.66 of the 2000 Act; | ||
• | impose civil penalties in cases of market abuse under s.123 of the 2000 Act; | ||
• | prohibit an individual from being employed in connection with a regulated activity, under s.56 of the 2000 Act; | ||
• | apply to Court for injunctions (or interdicts) and other orders against persons contravening relevant requirements (under s.380 of the 2000 Act) or engaging in market abuse (under s.381 of the 2000 Act); | ||
• | petition the court for the winding-up or administration of companies, and the bankruptcy of individuals, carrying on regulated activities; | ||
• | apply to the court under ss.382 and 383 of the 2000 Act for restitution orders against persons contravening relevant requirements or persons engaged in market abuse; | ||
• | require restitution under s.384 of the 2000 Act of profits which have accrued to authorised persons contravening relevant requirements or persons engaged in market abuse, or of losses which have been suffered by others as a result of those breaches; | ||
• | (in England and Wales) prosecute offences under the Money Laundering Regulations 1993, Part V Criminal Justice Act 1993 (insider dealing) and various offences under the 2000 Act including (Note: The FSA may also prosecute any other offences which are incidental to those which it has express statutory power to prosecute): | ||
- carrying on regulated activity without authorisation or exemption, under s.23; | |||
- making false claims to be authorised or exempt, under s.24; | |||
- promoting investment activity without authorisation, under s.25; | |||
- breaching a prohibition order, under s.56; | |||
- failing to co-operate with or giving false information to FSA appointed investigators, under s.177; | |||
- failing to comply with provisions about influence over authorised persons, under s.191; | |||
- making misleading statements and engaging in misleading practices, under s.397; | |||
- misleading the FSA, under s.398; | |||
- various offences in relation to the FSA'sPart VI function; | |||
• | Fine, issue public censures, suspend or cancel listing for breaches of the Listing Rules by an issuer; and | ||
• | Issue public censures or cancel a sponsor's approval. | ||
2 | DTI | ||
2.1 | The Secretary of State for Trade & Industry exercises concurrently with the FSA those powers and functions marked with an asterisk in paragraphs 1.3 above. The investigation functions are undertaken by Companies Investigation Branch ("CIB") and the prosecution functions by the Solicitors Office. | ||
2.2 | The principal activities of CIB are, however, the investigations into the conduct of companies under the Companies Acts and the Fair Trading Act. These are fact-finding investigations but may lead to follow-up action by CIB such as petitioning for the winding up of a company, disqualification of directors of the company or referring the matter to the Solicitors Office for prosecution. CIB may also disclose information to other prosecution or regulatory authorities to enable them to take appropriate action under their own powers and functions. Such disclosure is, however, strictly controlled under a gateway disclosure regime. | ||
2.3 | The Solicitors Office advises on investigation work carried out by CIB and undertakes criminal investigations and prosecutions in respect of matters referred to it by CIB, the Insolvency Service or other divisions of the DTI or its agencies. | ||
3 | SFO | ||
3.1 | The aim of the SFO is to contribute to: | ||
• | reducing fraud and the cost of fraud; | ||
• | the delivery of justice and the rule of law; | ||
• | maintaining confidence in the UK's business and financial institutions. | ||
3.2 | Under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 the Director of the SFO may investigate any suspected offence which appears on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud and may also conduct, or take over the conduct of, the prosecution of any such offence. The SFO may investigate in conjunction with any other person with whom the Director thinks it is proper to do so; that includes a police force (or the FSA or any other regulator). The criteria used by the SFO for deciding whether a case is suitable for it to deal with are set out in paragraph 3.3. | ||
3.3 | The key criterion should be that the suspected fraud is such that
the direction of the investigation should be in the hands of those who would
be responsible for any prosecution. The factors that are taken into account include: | ||
• | whether the amount involved is at least £1 million (this is simply an objective and recognisable signpost of seriousness and likely public concern rather than the main indicator of suitability); | ||
• | whether the case is likely to give rise to national publicity and widespread public concern. That includes those involving government bodies, public bodies, the governments of other countries and commercial cases of public interest; | ||
• | whether the case requires highly specialist knowledge of, for example, stock exchange practices or regulated markets; | ||
• | whether there is a significant international dimension; | ||
• | whether legal, accountancy and investigative skills need to be brought together; and | ||
• | whether the case appears to be complex and one in which the use of Section 2 powers might be appropriate. | ||
4 | CPS | ||
4.1 | The CPS has responsibility for taking over the conduct of all criminal proceedings instituted by the police in England and Wales. The CPS may advise the police in respect of criminal offences. The CPS prosecutes all kinds of criminal offences, including fraud. Fraud cases may be prosecuted by local CPS offices but the most serious and complex fraud cases will be prosecuted centrally. | ||
5 | ACPO and ACPO(S) | ||
5.1 | ACPO represents the police forces of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. ACPO(S) represents the police forces of Scotland. | ||
6 | The Crown Office | ||
6.1 | The investigation and prosecution of crime in Scotland is the responsibility of the Lord Advocate, who is the head of the Procurator Fiscal Service, which comprises Procurators Fiscal and their Deputes, who are answerable to the Lord Advocate. The Procurator Fiscal is the sole public prosecutor in Scotland, prosecuting cases reported not only by the police but all regulatory departments and agencies. All prosecutions before a jury, both in the High Court of Justiciary and in the Sheriff Court, run in the name of the Lord Advocate; all other prosecutions run in the name of the local Procurator Fiscal. The Head Office of the Procurator Fiscal Service is the Crown Office and the Unit within the Crown Office which deals with serious and complex fraud cases and with the investigation of cases of interest or concern to the Financial Services Authority is the Fraud and Specialist Services Unit: the remit of this Unit is directly comparable to that of the Serious Fraud Office. | ||
7 | The DPP(NI) | ||
7.1 | The DPP(NI) is responsible for the prosecution of all offences on indictment in Northern Ireland, other than offences prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office. The DPP(NI) is also responsible for the prosecution of certain summary offences, including offences reported to it by any government department. |
- 01/07/2005
ENF 2 Annex 2
Statement of policy on section 169(7) interviews (see ENF 2.8)
- 01/12/2004
See Notes
1 | This annex applies when the FSA: | |
(1) | has appointed, an investigator at the request of an overseas regulator , under section 169(1)(b) of the Act; and | |
(2) | has directed, or is considering directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) of the Act , to permit a representative of the overseas regulator to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the purposes of the investigation. | |
2 | In this annex a "section 169(7) interview" means any interview conducted for the purposes of an investigation under section 169(1)(b) of the Act in relation to which the FSA has given a direction under section 169(7) of the Act. |
3 | The purpose of this annex is to set out the statement of the FSA's policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction under section 169(7) has been given or the FSA is considering giving. The FSA is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by section 169(9) and (11) of the Act. As required by section 169(10) of the Act, the Treasury has approved the statement of policy. |
4 | The FSA is keen to promote co-operation with overseas regulators . It views assistance to overseas regulators as an essential part of the principles set out in section 2(3)(e) of the Act to which it must have regard in discharging its general functions. |
5 | Under section 169(1)(b) of the Act , the FSA may appoint an investigator to investigate any matter at the request of an overseas regulator . The powers of the investigator appointed by the FSA (referred to here as the ' FSA's investigator') include the power to require persons to attend at a specified time and place and answer questions (the compulsory interview power). |
6 | Where the FSA appoints an investigator in response to a request from an overseas regulator it may, under section 169(7) of the Act , direct him to permit a representative of that regulator to attend and take part in any interviews conducted for the purposes of the investigation. The FSA may only give a direction under section 169(7) if it is satisfied that any information obtained by an overseas regulator as a result of the interview will be subject to the safeguards equivalent to those contained in Part XXIII of the Act (Public Record, Disclosure of Information and Cooperation). |
7 | Part XXIII of the Act contains restrictions on the disclosure of confidential information. The restrictions are subject to exceptions contained in regulations made by the Treasury under section 349. |
8 | The FSA's policy on how it will use its investigative power, including its power to appoint investigators, in support of overseas regulators, is set out in ENF 2.8. | |
9 | The FSA may need to consider whether to use its direction power at two stages of an investigation: | |
(1) | at the same time that it considers the request from the overseas regulator to appoint investigators; | |
(2) | after it has appointed investigators, either at the request of the overseas regulator or on the recommendation of the investigators. | |
10 | Before making a direction under section 169(7) the FSA will discuss and determine with the overseas regulator how this statement of policy will apply to the conduct of the interview, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Amongst other matters, the FSA will at this stage determine the extent to which the representative of the overseas regulator will be able to participate in the interview. The overseas regulator will be notified of this determination on the issuing of the direction. | |
11 | The direction will contain the identity of the representative of the overseas regulator that is permitted to attend any interview and the role that he will play in the interview. If the FSA envisages that there will be more than one interview in the course of the investigation, the direction may also specify which interview(s) the overseas representative is allowed to attend. |
12 | In circumstances where an interview is to be conducted as part of the investigation, the FSA's investigator will have conduct of the interview. In general, the FSA's investigators will be employees of the FSA , but in appropriate cases the FSA may appoint persons who are not its employees. In those cases, the FSA may choose to require that an FSA employee is present at the interview and may choose to appoint that person as an investigator. | |
13 | The FSA's investigator will act on behalf of the FSA and under its control. He may be instructed to permit the representative of the overseas regulator to assist in preparation of the interview. Where the FSA considers it appropriate, it may permit the representative to attend and ask questions of the interviewee in the course of the interview. The interview will be conducted according to the terms of the direction and the notification referred to in ENF 2.4.3 Ann above. | |
14 | If the direction does permit the representative of an overseas regulator to attend the interview and ask the interviewee questions, the FSA's investigator will retain control of the interview throughout. Control of the interview means the following will apply: | |
(1) | The FSA's investigator instigates and concludes the interview, introduces everyone present and explains the procedure of the interview. He warns the interviewee of the possible consequences of refusing to answer questions and the uses to which any answers that are given can and cannot be put. The FSA's investigator will always ask preliminary questions, such as those establishing the identity of the interviewee. | |
(2) | The FSA's investigator determines the duration of the interview and when, if at all, there should be any breaks in the course of it. | |
(3) | The FSA's investigator has responsibility for making a record of the interview. The record should note the times and duration of any breaks in the interview and any periods when the representative of the overseas regulator was either present or not present. | |
(4) | Where the FSA's investigator considers it appropriate, he may either suspend the interview, ask the overseas representative to leave the interview, or terminate the interview and reschedule it for another occasion. In making that decision he will bear in mind the terms of the direction, any agreement made with the overseas regulator as to the conduct of the interview and the contents of this statement of policy. |
15 | The FSA will in general provide written notice of the appointment of an investigator to the person under investigation pursuant to the request of an overseas regulator. Whether or not the interviewee is the person under investigation, the FSA's investigator will inform the interviewee of the provisions under which he has been appointed, the identity of the requesting authority and general nature of the matter under investigation. The interviewee will also normally be informed if a representative of the overseas regulator is to attend and take part in the interview. Notification of any of these matters may not be provided in advance of the interview if the FSA believes that the circumstances are such that notification would be likely to result in the investigation being frustrated. |
16 | The interviewee will normally be given a copy of the direction issued under section 169(7) in advance of the interview unless to do so would be likely to result in the investigation being frustrated. The interviewee will also be provided with a copy of this statement of policy. |
17 | The FSA's investigator will determine the venue and timing of the interview. The interviewee will be notified of the venue and timing of the interview in advance and in writing. |
18 | When the FSA's investigator has exercised the compulsory interview power, at the outset of the interview the interviewee will be given an appropriate warning as stated in ENF 2.14.3 G. The warning, amongst other things, must state that the interviewee is obliged to answer all questions put to them during the interview, including any put by the representative of the overseas regulator . It will also state that in criminal proceedings or proceedings for market abuse the FSA will not use as evidence against the interviewee any information obtained under compulsion during the interview. |
19 | The FSA's investigator may decide which documents or other information may be put to the interviewee, and whether it is appropriate to give the interviewee sight of the documents before the interview takes place. Where the overseas regulator wishes to ask questions about documents during the interview and the FSA's investigator wishes to inspect those documents before the interview, he will be given the opportunity to do so. If the FSA's investigator wishes to inspect them and has not been able to do so before the interview, he may suspend the interview until he has had an opportunity to inspect them. |
20 | When the FSA's investigator has exercised the compulsory interview power, the FSA's investigator will require the person attending the interview to answer questions. Where appropriate, questions may also be posed by the representative of the overseas regulator. The interviewee will also be required to answer these questions. The FSA's investigator may intervene at any stage during questioning by the representative of the overseas regulator. |
21 | Interviews will, in general, be conducted in English. Where the interviewee's first language is not English, at the request of the interviewee arrangements will be made for the questions to be translated into the interviewee's first language and for his answers to be translated back into English. If a translator is employed at the request of the representative of the overseas regulator then the translation costs will normally be met by the overseas regulator. Where interviews are being conducted in pursuance of a Community obligation these costs will be met by the FSA. In any event, the meeting of costs in relation to translators and, where applicable, the translation of documents will always be agreed in advance with the overseas regulator. |
22 | All compulsory interviews will be tape-recorded. The method of recording will be decided on and arranged by the FSA's investigator. Costs will be addressed similarly to that set out in the preceding paragraph. The FSA will not provide the overseas regulator with transcripts of the tapes of interviews unless specifically agreed to, but copies of the tapes will normally be provided where requested. The interviewee will be provided with a copy of tapes of the interview but will only be provided with transcripts of the tapes or translations of any transcripts if he agrees to meet the cost of producing them. |
23 | The interviewee may be accompanied at the interview by a legal adviser or a non-legally qualified observer of his choice. The costs of any representation will not be met by the FSA . The presence at the interview of a representative of the overseas regulator may mean that the interviewee wishes to be represented or accompanied by a person either from or familiar with that regulator's jurisdiction. As far as practical the arrangements for the interview should accommodate this wish. However, the FSA reserves the right to proceed with the interview if it is not possible to find such a person within a reasonable time or no such person is able to attend at a suitable venue. |
24 | In relation to the publication of investigations by overseas regulators, the FSA will pursue a policy similar to the policy that relates to its own investigations. The FSA's policy on publicity during investigations can be found at ENF 2.13. |
- 01/12/2004
ENF 2 Annex 3
Summary of the FSA's information-gathering and investigation powers referred to in ENF 2.5
- 01/12/2004
See Notes
Section | 165 | 166 | 167 | 168 |
Description of the power | FSA's power to require information. | Reports by skilled persons. | Appointment of persons to carry out general investigations. | Appointment of persons to carry out investigations in particular cases. |
Grounds | The information and documents required must be reasonably required in connection with the exercise by the FSA of functions conferred on it by or under the Act. | The report must be on any matter about which the FSA has required or could require the provision of information or production of documents under section 165. | It must appear to the FSA that there is good reason for appointing investigators. | It must appear to the FSA that there are circumstances suggesting that specified breaches, contraventions, market abuse or offences may have occurred. |
Persons who may be subject of the information requirement /report/investigation | Firm/former firm.Person connected with firm/former firm. Operator etc. of recognised CIS. RIE or RCH. | Firm ("A").Any other member of A's group.Partnership of which A is a member.Person who has at any relevant time been a person falling within any of the three categories mentioned above. | Firm or appointed representative.Former firm or appointed representative (in relation to certain matters).Member of the group of which the person under investigation ("A") is part (if investigator thinks it necessary). Partnership of which A is a member (if investigator thinks it necessary). | A range of persons depending on the circumstances or suspected breaches. |
Type of person who may exercise or be authorised or appointed under the power | FSA (by notice in writing). FSA officer (i.e an officer of the FSA, including a member of FSA staff or agent of the FSA). | Skilled person nominated or approved by the FSA. | Competent person (including FSA member of staff). | Competent person (including FSA member of staff). |
Powers of FSA/information-gatherers/skilled persons/ investigators | To require information. To require documents. To require information to be verified. To require documents to be authenticated. To require explanations of documents. |
No specific powers - but there is a duty on persons providing services to the subject of the report to provide all such assistance as the skilled person may reasonably require. | To require persons to attend and answer questions. To require information. To require documents. To require explanations of documents. |
To require persons to attend and answer questions. To require information. To require documents. To require explanations of documents. To require reasonable assistance (section 168(2) investigator only). |
- 01/12/2004